These discussions, initiated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)for Counterproliferation (CP) Policy and echoed by the National Defense University's Center for CP Research and other critics, propose that the military services have incorrectly addressed BW defense since Operation Desert Storm.
The Defense Planning Guidance released in April 2002 directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to review the need to develop and promulgate a joint concept of operations plan (CONPLAN) for the BW defense of joint task forces and fixed sites.
A main concern was that by treating BW defense as a "subset" of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense, the military was arbitrarily limiting its procedures and doctrine, thus limiting its overall defensive capabilities.
To break out of the "too hard to do" BW defense
box, we need to train and exercise in a more realistic manner, devise new operational concepts, and seek to field sufficient quantities of appropriate prophylactic capabilities.