bank run

(redirected from Bank Panics)
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ThesaurusAntonymsRelated WordsSynonymsLegend: run - the concerted action of depositors who try to withdraw their money from a bank because they think it will failbank run - the concerted action of depositors who try to withdraw their money from a bank because they think it will fail
bank withdrawal - the withdrawal of money from your account at a bank
References in periodicals archive ?
By taking a little discussed time period of American history and introducing the conflicts over the gold standard, inflation and deflation, bank panics and the Federal Reserve, the basics of financial economics can be examined.
It was the succession of English bank panics from 1825 to 1866 that led Walter Bagehot in 1873 to advocate that the central bank should stay the panic by acting as the lender of last resort, i.
Furthermore, there were many ways to avoid bank panics other than the complex machinery of the Federal Reserve.
Thus, whereas the monetarist view focuses on bank panics and monetary aggregates to explain crises, the asymmetric information theory looks at more particular microeconomic failures in institutions or markets.
In other words, Friedman conceives of the bank panics as an enormous shock to aggregate demand.
in 1866, a giant interconnected bank denied a bailout on the grounds that it was poorly managed and deserved to fail, the English system suffered no bank panics for the remainder of the 19th century.
By the time you take the oath of office, the worst of the bank panics should be behind us.
According to the World Bank, bank panics today are twice as prevalent than during the period before financial globalization.
In some ways, however, the monetary policy response to all three of these experiences was similar to the response to bank panics that the Federal Reserve System was created to handle.
Gorton (1988) discusses what he calls the "recession hypothesis," according to which bank panics are closely associated with the business cycle.
They had the potential to be a major force behind monetary contraction before the bank panics started and the downturn gained momentum.
Friedman and Schwartz [1963] treated bank panics as exogenous shocks to money supply and did not consider output and the price level as significant determinants of either high-powered money or the money multiplier.