eternalist

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eternalist

(ɪˈtɜːnəlɪst)
n
(Philosophy) philosophy a person who believes in the eternal existence of matter or the world
References in periodicals archive ?
TRAVIS FIGG, "How to Understand the Debate Between Presentism and Eternalism.
They cover the ancient history from the pre-Socratics to the dawn of the medieval period, the modern history to the beginning of the 19th century, McTaggart and the unreality of time, the A-theory and the B-theory of time, presentism versus eternalism, the open future, perdurance and endurance, the experience of time, time travel, and physics and the philosophy of time.
One of the most central doctrines of Buddhism is the rejection of annihilationism (ucchedadrsti--the view that the self is annihilated at death) and eternalism (sasvatadrsti--the view that the self survives death) in favor of a "middle way," but that middle way depends on commitments to mind/body dualism, kamma/karma, and rebirth, and none of these commitments are compatible with contemporary science.
Here of course, "false views" refers to eternalism (thivatavada) while the "destruction of actions" would follow from annihilationism (ucchedavada).
Consequently dependent origination is in no way associated with morality which infers eternalism, which depends upon a theory of existence of the self.
Their concept of the self was largely materialistic as opposed to the idealistic version proposed by adherents of eternalism.
According to eternalism, the past, present, and future share the same ontological status, so past, present, and future objects exist.
eternalism (attributed to theists by Buddhists), and these are categories used by Attwood in his response to my essay: "Adams seems to interpret anatman as an extreme form of nihilism"; (7) and "Underlying Adams's argument is an emotional commitment to what Buddhists call an eternalistic ideology (sassatavada).
Putting aside for the moment the discussion about the relationship between ultimate truth and relative truth, or the one about the "middle way" between eternalism and nihilism, we can simply note that general semanticists, though they may not speak of "ultimate truth" or see the Buddhist discussions as relevant to their purposes, will still probably agree with what we might call "the gist of Nagarjuna's stanza.
No matter what the absolute truth of eternalism may be, according to Dzogchen's point of view, although histories exist of gods and deities over many generations, they are still momentary.
Free from eternalism or nihilism I am a Madhyamaka.
The overall argument of this paper, then is that, if one wishes to hold that we directly perceive external things, we should subscribe to the latter view of time, that is, eternalism.