n.1.One who foreknows.
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The Problem of Freedom is at least potentially the more serious of the two, since an infallible foreknower curtails the (libertarian) freedom of anyone whose actions he foreknows, whereas the only intentionality that can be thwarted by such knowledge is his own (no matter what he foreknows about the actions of others).
However one assesses the relative seriousness of these two problems, both arise in their strongest form when the foreknower is not a human agent but the theistic God, a being understood to be essentially omniscient, unerring, and sempiternal.
These assumptions are: (1) that the Problem of Agency is logically independent of the Problem of Freedom; (2) that the Problem of Agency imposes a general stricture on (rational) agency; (3) that it is only the libertarian conception of (free) agency that is threatened by the Problem of Freedom; and (4) that the Problem of Agency is most serious for an omniscient foreknower like the theistic God.