22) Informal logic here would note that such inductive arguments
are weak and/or not cogent; probability and statistics would note the low probability for the conclusion, given the small sample observed.
It reorders different kinds of inductive arguments
for better flow between topics, reorganizes some sections, and omits the more difficult and confusing topics.
In other words, premises of inductive arguments
are experienced but their conclusion is not experienced.
Ruth Weintraub, in 'Skepticism about Induction', rehearses Hume's argument that inductive arguments
are ultimately unjustified, since they presuppose that nature is uniform although the idea that nature is uniform can itself only be established by an inductive argument
E McKenzie's "Printers of the Mind" (1969) and his challenge to the inductive arguments
of the New Bibliographers, supported by documents reporting the work of actual compositors in real printing houses.
Another section that should prove valuable to those who are interested in the logic and force of inductive arguments
based upon experience concerns what Tuominen dubs the "sorties" argument (pp.
They consider competing views, make bottom-up inductive arguments
from an array of facts and doubt the power of Big Ideas.
Boyd argues that one can abstract criteria for evaluating inductive arguments
from Strawson's writings, and he proceeds to identify such criteria.
38--in the Treatise he stresses the regress involved in using inductive arguments
to justify inductive arguments
; see A Treatise of Human Nature, edited L.
, which are based on the abstract principles of value rationale, enable conclusions along the lines that the rent for property X would be relatively low per square foot, because X is a larger property than the comparables, according to the principle of balance.
For, in the first place, the authors, taking their cue from Popper, represent this problem as arising from the inability of true premises in inductive arguments
to guarantee the certainty of conclusions drawn.
It is fairly widely acknowledged that inductive arguments
for the reliability of induction are in some sense unacceptably circular, even if the arguments do not involve the premise that induction is a truth-conducive inference form.