This textbook explores the logic of games in which the players simultaneously select from a set of possible actions, introduces the prisonerAEs dilemma, and compares the outcomes of Nash equilibrium
to outcomes that could be achieved by a central planner optimizing a global objective function.
Keywords: cognitive radio network, dynamic game, heterogeneous service, Nash Equilibrium
, weighted interference graph
In view of the above research, this paper firstly establishes a game model for the telecom carrier and the third party payment company and obtains the Nash equilibrium
by solving the model, secondly acquires the constraint conditions of mobile payment between the two parties through analysis of the influencing factors of the two parties, and finally draws the appropriate application model (Barkhordari et al.
The Nash equilibrium
solution for the symmetric duopoly model recommends that two firms charge a price equal to the common marginal cost of production (Tirole 1988, 210).
According to Jury's stability criterion, conditions (16) can be got which shows that the stability of the Nash equilibrium
is determined by adjusting parameters ([k.
A Nash equilibrium
was originally formulated by Cournot (1838) in the context of an oligopoly model, so an equilibrium point might also be seen as a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
In section three the regulated circular model is analysed in order to verify the equivalence of the games and concludes by seeking for the existence of Nash equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium
occurs when both players are playing the best possible response they can, given the actions of the other player.
In this study the Nash equilibrium
is achieved through the rational consideration of administrators and academic staff who fall into a prisoner's dilemma, one of the best known game strategies in which it is demonstrated that two people might not cooperate even if it is in both their best interests to do so (Osborne, 2003).
The paper pretends to prove that with Nash equilibrium
there will always be a strategy that works as an incentive for the parties to not abandon the negotiations in a controversy.
This yields a correlated equilibrium (see Aumann (1974, 1987)) instead of a Nash equilibrium
(see Nash (1950)).
Viewing the situation this way makes it a game, and the Nash equilibrium
would be the outcome at which each branch is making its decision to maximize NSB, given what the other branch is doing.