naturalistic fallacy


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naturalistic fallacy

n
(Philosophy) the supposed fallacy of inferring evaluative conclusions from purely factual premises. Compare Hume's law, non-naturalism
References in periodicals archive ?
This, however, does not mean acceptance of the naturalistic fallacy that everything natural and untampered by human technology is necessarily good.
Moore and David Hume's formulations of the naturalistic fallacy (explaining the good in terms of natural properties); the nature of normativity in language; a perspectivist account of the normativity of meaning; a neurocognitive approach to the normativity of mathematics; F.
Braude's discussion of nous is marginally diminished by his claim that Aristotle's position on the naturalistic fallacy, the fact/value distinction, is unclear.
This potential dilemma highlights the need for such a position to face up to the naturalistic fallacy.
As Wyschogrod writes: "Were concrete actuality the causal ground of value, the naturalistic fallacy of a discredited old-style positivism would have been resurrected" (p.
In contrast to Hume's is-ought objection and Moore's naturalistic fallacy and even to the new natural-law theory represented by Germaine Grisez and John Finnis, Boyd argues against any fact-value dichotomy.
From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development.
With respect to evolutionary or "biological" explanations of human behavior, one central mission must be to identify the naturalistic fallacy in all its persistent and pernicious incarnations and to refute it with rigor and clarity.
Countering philosophers like Kant and Hume and present scholars like Paul Ehrlich who criticize those who use human nature as a guide to morality for having fallen prey to a "naturalistic fallacy", Fukuyama devotes 15 pages to explaining why he believes the naturalistic fallacy is fallacious.
From an agreement with the analytical critique of the naturalistic fallacy (from a reinterpretation of the position of Hume, and an exposition of the doctrine in Moore and the analytical philosophy) the author shows that in the case of a descriptive statement about the human life as such (as a human being responsible by his/her life it self), this type of statement is also "implicit" normative.
As Dominican Benedict Ashley once noted, Finnis and Grisez often appear overwhelmed philosophically by the prospect of falling victim to the purported naturalistic fallacy.
So, there's no need to commit the naturalistic fallacy and say that anything we find in nature is good.