In two of his best known papers, he explores environments requiring different types of reputation: whereas a monopolist tries to convey an image of toughness to defend its market position and fend off unwanted competition, in situations of multilateral conflict like the repeated prisoners' dilemma
, the goal is to pursue a reputation for cooperative behavior.
I]n analyzing international securities regulation, the Prisoners' Dilemma
is a useful paradigm in only a few of the problems that arise in practice.
Therefore, a system may be a possible way to avoid the prisoners' dilemma
He emphasizes the Prisoners' Dilemma
and its applications and details six ways to change games (commitment, regulation, cartelization, retaliation, trust, and relationships), which involve the Prisoners' Dilemma
and other game-theory ideas (the timing of moves, strategic evolution, and equilibrium), then applies the approach to real strategic problems: how to keep prices low on the internet, how to build trust on eBay, how to reverse the global trend toward antibiotic resistance that could lead to diseases like tuberculosis, how to avoid regulatory failures in fisheries management, how to reform real estate agency, and how to relieve emergency departments of the burden of drug addicts seeking narcotic pain medications.
places its [legislative] advocates in a prisoners' dilemma
In this paper, we study the effect of equilibrium punishment threats on cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
THE FISCAL CLIFF negotiations between the two parties in Washington are reminiscent of a prisoners' dilemma
In these series of experiments we used an iterated prisoners' dilemma
game (IPDG) to examine the effect of metaconfingendes on aggregate products of the interrelated behavior of four players.
Figure 1 illustrates Axelrod's Prisoners' Dilemma
The story of the prisoners' dilemma
is based on two men, charged with a joint violation of a law, and held separately by the police.
This payoff structure is known as "the prisoners' dilemma
Although the Tit-for-Tat strategy cannot possibly win the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma
in an encounter with another single strategy, none the less it has--following the principle that 'weakness is strength'--the best chance to come out as overall victor in a tournament of all against all (for details, see Robert Axelrod.