propositional attitude


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propositional attitude

n
(Philosophy) logic philosophy a relation between a person and a proposition, such as belief, desire, intention, etc
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The structure of the book is as follows: In Chapter 1, Hossack articulates the thesis that knowledge is a fundamental, primitive relation that obtains between a mind and a fact in the world, rather than a propositional attitude.
Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other.
Regarding our classification of claim types proposed above, eliminativism by total explanatory failure should be associated to type A claims--Indeed, Churchland (1981) does not only argue for the elimination of 'propositional attitude' but also for the non-existence of propositional attitudes.
My positive case will rely on a specific reading of sentences with recurrence in indirect context, a reading that takes propositional attitude verbs and other operators with similar status more seriously.
Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 2007) consider that a propositional attitude is episodic when one is conscious of it happening and exerting causal influence over one's own actions.
511) states that operators of natural language, including all verbs of propositional attitude, operate only on the content of indexicals because only contents are found under the scope of these elements.
RESUMEN: Segun la Propositional Attitude View (PAV), un hablante es competente en su idioma en virtud de poseer actitudes proposicionales cuyo contenido es su gramatica interna.
Bengson and Moffett argue that Ryle's regress centers on the issue of intelligence and intelligent action (an account of a certain type of non-intelligently exercised propositional attitude is needed).
Correspondence is the condition of being successfully directed toward the world in a propositional attitude, and exists when our orientation to the world allows what is to show itself in a particular way.
But no actual psychological theory has ever pretended to provide a set of laws which distinguish, say, the state of being jealous of Desdemona's supposed love for Cassio from every other actual or possible propositional attitude.
For example, some propositional attitude predicates, such as hegeisthai 'believe', or oisthai 'believe', take infinitive complements (example [5] above).
If they encountered a propositional attitude that was like a belief in all respects except that it was not true, however, they would face the same choices as we faced in the case of the pink "daisies.