There is no absolutely no reference to relevant empirical work, nor even any mention of the many recent philosophical proposals about propositional attitudes
that, without drawing Travis's apparently radical conclusions, nevertheless explicitly endorse context sensitivity--for example, Mark Crimmins and John Perry; (3) Richard Larson, Peter Ludlow, (4) and Gabriel Segal; (5) and Mark Richard.
For example, although he is of course not ignorant of externalistic approaches to the content of propositional attitudes
, his response is simply to introduce the idea of a narrow style of content that is supposed to characterise the common conscious contentful core shared by the ordinary subject and (say) the vat-brain (pp.
Moreover, insofar as there is a causal connection between the propositional attitudes
we are able to adopt, and the beliefs that are thereby generated, we can be said to have exercised indirect, roundabout, control over belief-formation.
Rather, propositional attitudes
influence behavior as a package deal, in conjunction with other background attitudes.
Kaplan) utterance is a situation in which an agent performs a locutionary act--thus implicating a language and various propositional attitudes
The truth of sentences constructed from intensional verbs can be explained in terms of the truth of sentences that are unproblematic for RWR, for example, sentences dominated by operators expressing propositional attitudes
Skepticism is simply dismissed as incoherent on the basis of an externalist theory of propositional attitudes
that is assumed to be correct without argument.
Propositions are the objects of propositional attitudes
, such as knowledge and belief; they can be true or false.
7] Folk psychology is, they argue, committed to propositional modularity: propositional attitudes
, on the folk conception, are functionally discrete, semantically interpretable states that play a causal role in the production of other mental states and behavior.
Similarly, Ramsey, Stich, and Garon  have argued that folk psychology is committed to the claim that propositional attitudes
like belief and desire are 'functionally discrete, semantically interpretable states that play a causal role in the production of other propositional attitudes
, and ultimately in the production of behavior' (p.
The dogma springs from two main sources: a too close comparison of mental imagery to perceptual experience and a too strong division between mental imagery and the traditional propositional attitudes
(such as belief and desire).
Such narratives are concrete, in that they are concerned with particular persons in particular situations, and understanding them presupposes having a handle on propositional attitudes
involving content and the way in which they are connected to each other.