If types of mental states were defined by their physical properties, we would have a position called type physicalism. For example, type physicalism would hold that the type of mental phenomenon called an individual's belief is nothing but neuronal activity at some particular set of x--y--z stereotaxic coordinates in the brain.
Much of contemporary cognitive psychology accepts token physicalism but not type physicalism. Thus, contemporary cognitive psychology holds that when an individual is said to intend or believe, some neurons in the brain are surely active, and those neurons can be identified with activity at some particular set of x--y--z stereotaxic coordinates.
The third argument is that just as cognitive psychology and neobehaviorism adhere to token but not type physicalism, so does radical behaviorism, so what's the difference?
Thus, much of cognitive psychology adopts token physicalism but not type physicalism.
They all subscribe to both token and type physicalism, and all are entirely inadequate.