I shall then briefly sketch the nature of that fundamental science which I believe to be the true metaphysic, in which mind and matter alike are seen to be constructed out of a neutral stuff, whose causal laws have no such duality as that of psychology, but form the basis upon which both physics and psychology are built.
It is such considerations that make students of psychophysiology materialistic in their methods, whatever they may be in their metaphysics. There are, of course, exceptions, such as Professor J.
Causal laws so stated would, I believe, be applicable to psychology and physics equally; the science in which they were stated would succeed in achieving what metaphysics has vainly attempted, namely a unified account of what really happens, wholly true even if not the whole of truth, and free from all convenient fictions or unwarrantable assumptions of metaphysical entities.
Farrer received, and acknowledged, Hartshorne's criticism of the unattainability of the Scholastic idea of God, and it prompted him to review the somewhat disjointed analogical scale of Finite and Infinite, with the result that the `activity'
metaphysic of the self deployed in that work, but abandoned in its conception of God, was now applied more consistently to the Godhead; thus, Conti argues, Farrer's later philosophical theology fitted in much more closely with a process `Becoming' model of God than with a static, Scholastic `Being' model.
Clearly such epistemic faith does not provide the proper basis on which to found a
metaphysic.
Is he planning to present Srividya as a
metaphysic sufficient to put an end to all our doubts concerning any realities?
Look now, from the illumination of Homer, up to the source of the light in the convex jewel worn on the breast of Dame
Metaphysic. Vico says that the jewel cannot be flat or it would emit only a single ray of light.
In Section III I emphasize a (surprisingly neglected) argument of David Lewis's for a four-dimensional
metaphysic and attempt to bring home the implausibility of maintaining the distinctness of constitution and identity within the context of such a
metaphysic (in this section I draw on, and put to my own use, a recent discussion by Peter Simons (1991)).
The Kantian critical project does not account for how we experience and for this reason fails at what it attempts, namely, a
metaphysic of knowledge.
Harrison does this while only occasionally allowing himself to become recruited as an acolyte-expositor of Lawrence's so-called
metaphysic, as so many critics have done in the past.