In this case, goodness--understood, it should be noted, specifically as an appetible
object rather than as, say, the predicate of a moral action--is necessarily self-referential.
Now recall that the degree to which the will is determined by the intellect is directly proportionate to the nature of the appetible object.
According to Gallagher, Thomas must believe that the will is able to control how the intellect considers the appetible object.
Given his motivation to defend Aquinas from the charge of cognitive determinism, Gallagher is obliged ultimately to ascribe to Aquinas not only that the will can control or influence how the intellect evaluates or considers appetible objects but also that it can do so autonomously.
That is, when the appetible object is good from all points of view (sub omni ratione boni), as is the case with happiness, the will is necessitated (necessitatur) to choose it since the intellect can only present it to the will under a desirable description.
This is due to the fact that it can control how the intellect considers appetible objects, a notion that bears a striking resemblance to Giles's own theory.
Perhaps the central difference between Giles's and Thomas's accounts is that for the latter, the act of specificatio really does mean that the intellect has evaluated the appetible object through a process of deliberation and determined it to be good or bad.