emotivism

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emotivism

(ɪˈməʊtɪˌvɪzəm)
n
(Philosophy) ethics the theory that moral utterances do not have a truth value but express the feelings of the speaker, so that murder is wrong is equivalent to down with murder. Also called: boo-hurrah theory Compare prescriptivism, descriptivism
References in periodicals archive ?
Emotional Governance in Advanced Capitalism: Between Emotivist Nihilism and Adaptive Neo-Communitarianism
The emotivist hypothesis has to be rejected immediately.
Virtue ethics is a rational ethics, while the prevailing approach among modern philosophers, starting with Hume, turned human ends into an irrational matter, addressing ethical problems according to consequentialist, sensist, emotivist, or voluntarist criteria.
This paper fills out such a solution to the negation problems, following some of the original emotivist ideas about the interplay of interests in conversation.
Ross does not have much to say about meta-ethical questions in On Law and Justice, but his distinction between assertions, which can be true or false, and directives, which lack truth-value (13), together with his comments on the idea of justice, suggest that he still adhered to the emotivist version of non-cognitivism in the late 1950's.
The selection of attributes and vocalization of constructive criticism is essential, defying the quietism that attends subjectivist or emotivist theories of art.
Therefore, essential contestability is not a part of emotivist moral theories which at first glance occupy a similar position.
This means that he is not to: (1) defend the Christian scripture or belief but "to defend CE from PRD"; (2) use any "non-realist conception of truth" (despite the complexity of religious truth) assuming that both religious and non-religious propositions have a truth-value; (3) consider any emotivist views; (4) consider any non-cognitivist views.
The rational struggle to grasp the elusive, but enrapturing, splendor of intelligible form has given way to ungrounded advocacy of the maximization of emotivist preference in the global bazaar of secular, social democracy.
His proposal is based on an articulation of MacIntyre's concern (1984) regarding the modern manager (and by extension, the educators) being an emotivist, and not being able to participate in the virtues she or he derives for the modern world.
Both men are arguing that we are on the wrong road: MacIntyre that we are on an emotivist road to nihilism, Hayek that we are on a totalitarian road to serfdom.
In this quote the individualistic and emotivist assumptions of Shabad became quite visible, as there are no explicit external or transcendent guidelines (although one might argue there are many implicit guidelines assumed by Shabad) for how one is to use their passion, openness, conscience, or personal truths.