emotivism

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emotivism

(ɪˈməʊtɪˌvɪzəm)
n
(Philosophy) ethics the theory that moral utterances do not have a truth value but express the feelings of the speaker, so that murder is wrong is equivalent to down with murder. Also called: boo-hurrah theory Compare prescriptivism, descriptivism
References in periodicals archive ?
Therefore, essential contestability is not a part of emotivist moral theories which at first glance occupy a similar position.
The rational struggle to grasp the elusive, but enrapturing, splendor of intelligible form has given way to ungrounded advocacy of the maximization of emotivist preference in the global bazaar of secular, social democracy.
His proposal is based on an articulation of MacIntyre's concern (1984) regarding the modern manager (and by extension, the educators) being an emotivist, and not being able to participate in the virtues she or he derives for the modern world.
Both men are arguing that we are on the wrong road: MacIntyre that we are on an emotivist road to nihilism, Hayek that we are on a totalitarian road to serfdom.
In this quote the individualistic and emotivist assumptions of Shabad became quite visible, as there are no explicit external or transcendent guidelines (although one might argue there are many implicit guidelines assumed by Shabad) for how one is to use their passion, openness, conscience, or personal truths.
He shows how contemporary moral fragmentation, in the form of emotivist and utilitarian culture, is connected to the loss of Aristotelian ethics together with the inability of the Enlightenment to supply any suitable substitution for it.
While critics of IBE (or of inference causation generally) may be suspicious of the inherent risk that a legal fact-finder might fudge cause-in-fact on emotivist grounds, that risk is an unavoidable concomitant of the epistemology of legal fact-finding.
84) This 'empiricist, emotivist, non-cognitivist, amoral ethical doctrine' reduces language expressive of those moral inward realities that human inwardness enfolds to evincements of emotional states.
If I endorse liberty on, say, Aristotelian Lockean grounds and you endorse it on, say, emotivist grounds, we need not worry about the justificatory questions that divide us; we ought instead to focus on the substantive agreement that unites us.
And notice how a utilitarian emotivist could embrace the claim that causing suffering is a wrong-making property in this normative sense, even while denying the above metaethical claim; for the emotivist, the wrongness of causing suffering metaethically will be understood in terms of the attitudes of agents toward causing suffering).
In the realm of practices the authority of both goods and standards operates in such a way as to rule out all subjectivist and emotivist analyses of judgment (MacIntyre 1981:190).
These authors suggest that the mark of a cognitive intuitionism is the assumption that mental states serve a representational function, rather than emotivist theory that assumes mental states serve primarily nonrepresentational functions (p.