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1. Unpredictability.
2. Philosophy The doctrine that there are events, particularly free human actions or decisions, that have no cause or are not caused deterministically.

in′de·ter′min·ist n.
in′de·ter′min·is′tic adj.


(Philosophy) the philosophical doctrine that behaviour is not entirely determined by motives
ˌindeˈterminist n, adj
ˌindeˌterminˈistic adj


(ˌɪn dɪˈtɜr məˌnɪz əm)

a theory that human actions, though influenced by preexisting conditions, are not entirely governed by them.
in`de•ter′min•ist, n., adj.


the quality of not being clearly established or fixed. — indeterminist, n.indeterministic, adj.
See also: Attitudes
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References in periodicals archive ?
To that end we presented a branching tree account of indeterminism, limiting technicalities to the bare minimum that must be mastered by anyone who professes to advance an account of indeterminism, including objectively characterized free will, that will stand up to a searching examination by reason.
Contemporary Western philosophical positions on free will are almost entirely defined by their stance on the question of whether determinism or indeterminism is compatible with free will, (8) which poses the following dilemma.
Free will skepticism, as Campbell understands it, is motivated by incompatibilism--the view that free will is incompatible with determinism--combined with the view that indeterminism cannot help.
Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action.
2) A form of indeterminism, which saw all experiences as without any cause or condition (ahetu-appaccaya), but as being due to pure chance (A.
In the latter case, Goldstick argues that our sense of time--our ability to see events as following in succession--is incompatible with indeterminism.
KOROLEV, "The Limits of Predictability: Indeterminism and Undecidability in Classical and Quantum Physics.
But it does not follow from the fact that indeterminism does not reduce the agent's control that the decision is not lucky: it might be lucky on the determinist scenario too.
This account introduces a new way in which a Lewis-style "best system" might capture regularities in a broadly Humean world; a defense is given against a charge of indeterminism that applies to any such approach to laws.
Then comes a chapter dealing with quantum indeterminism (conceptually aligned with the free will objections) and correlations; the discussion was way too loose here, almost to the point of inaccuracy.
For Merleau-Ponty, the principle must be conceived neither as positive nor negative, neither as infinite nor finite, neither as internal nor external, neither as objective nor subjective; it can be thought neither through idealism nor realism, neither through finalism (teleology) nor mechanism, neither through determinism nor indeterminism, neither through humanism nor naturalism.
Hankinson is responsible for the next two chapters, one on explanation and causation, the other on determinism and indeterminism.