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1. The state or quality of being intense; intensity.
2. The act of becoming intense or more intense; intensification.
3. Logic The sum of the attributes contained in a term.

[Latin intēnsiō, intēnsiōn-, from intēnsus, stretched; see intense.]

in·ten′sion·al adj.


(Logic) logic (of a predicate) incapable of explanation solely in terms of the set of objects to which it is applicable; requiring explanation in terms of meaning or understanding. Compare extensional See also opaque context, Electra paradox
inˈtensionally adv
ThesaurusAntonymsRelated WordsSynonymsLegend:
Adj.1.intensional - used of the set of attributes that distinguish the referents of a given word
logic - the branch of philosophy that analyzes inference
connotative - having the power of implying or suggesting something in addition to what is explicit
References in periodicals archive ?
In the Ilahiyyat Avicenna develops and employs a number of recondite metaphysical distinctions; he focuses especially on the way in which the absolutely universal notion of being (mawjud, ens) can be intensionally amplified and extensionally contracted by various sorts of notional transformations.
We can better adjust to realities when we recognize our tendency to intensionally identify and give words more importance than the structures and realities we use them to represent.
They are neither extensionally nor intensionally equivalent.
They are extensionally equivalent but intensionally very different--something not captured in either the Hohfeld-Corbin approach or in later versions of Realism.
In a relation of x = y + z, y is intensionally defined as x - z.
From my perspective, sameness of intension is determined by a definition of intensional equivalence that specifies when two descriptions are to be considered intensionally the same.
The crucial difference lies in the fact that they are not conceived as completed infinite sets, but as intensionally determined, infinitely proceeding sequences.
It should be stressed again at this point that, contra Dayal, I take the view that generics, in principle, do not refer extensionally to existing members of a kind but instead always refer intensionally, pointing to the name of the kind.
Intensionally, however, the relationship of "containment" has been seen as holding in the opposite direction.
These two concerns may become inextricable when classes are defined intensionally (when the possession of a given set of properties strictly implies class membership), but they do not when class membership is primitive.
Again, we have identified a very significant body of connections between three intensionally quite different similarity relations.
Most Prolog implementations provide built-in features, such as the setof predicate, for building a set intensionally rather than extensionally; this means that a set is defined as the collection of all elements satisfying a given a property, instead of explicitly enumerating all elements belonging to the set.