mentalese


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men·tal·ese

 (mĕn′tl-ēz′, -lēs′)
n.
A hypothetical language in which concepts and propositions are represented in the mind without words.

mentalese

(ˌmɛntəlˈiːz)
n
(Philosophy) a hypothetical mental system, resembling language, in which concepts can be pictured and combined without the use of words
References in periodicals archive ?
Whether or not the neo-Gricean is correct that p-meaning can be defined in terms of t-meaning and then t-meaning defined in terms of the causal-functional roles of mentalese expressions, it is apt to seem obvious that separate accounts are needed of p-meaning and t-meaning, since p-meaning, unlike t-meaning, must be understood at least partly in terms of communication.
She could believe Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn by accepting the mentalese sentence "Mark Twain is the author of Huckleberry Finn.
If thought coincides with language, there is in each of us one true language, and this is not the English or German with which we may have grown up but mentalese, (5) or the language of thought.
Ontological Reduction by Logical Analysis and the Primitive Vocabulary of Mentalese, GYULA KLIMA
Fixing the shortcomings of LOT 1 requires supplementing the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) with pure referentialist semantics of Mentalese.
However, since from the com putational perspective the Mentalese formulae are sensitive to syntax rather than content, beliefs with the same content can still differ in their causal powers as long as the underlying mental states are tokenings of type-distinct mental representations.
Explaining the pivotal dual role of Mentalese in referring to things in the world and in defining mental processes, Fodor proposes a 'filing cabinet' metaphor as a model for a possible cognitive architecture of mind.
CHRISTOPHER DAVID VIGER, "Mental Content in a Physical World: An Alternative to Mentalese.
1987); --, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics (M.
They would involve tokens of different mentalese symbol types, MARCUS and TULLIUS, which are nonetheless synonymous in virtue of their coextensionality.
The "illustration-plus-text" proposal collapses, however, for the text is either in the mental language (hereafter, "Mentalese"), or else reduces to it; and Mentalese, so far as Augustine is concerned, is a pictorial system of representation.
To possess Mentalese is to have a capacity to produce signs which may stand for one thing or "confusedly" for many; and this raises the question as to how the capacity is acquired.