Consequently, meanings can be understood as either detailed, static, rigid and finite inventories of senses, oscillating between rampant polysemy (Lakoff 1987) and monosemy
(Goldberg 1995), or as meaning potentials (Vandeloise 1994; Kemmer 2005; Szwedek 2007).
This paper does not address the question of whether extension is based on, or reflects, monosemy
or polysemy of kin terms (see Noricks 1987 for a discussion), but it does articulate the mechanisms inherent in such extensions.
We argue that both the gradual diachronic expansion of the range of uses of both items, and the small, but nevertheless clear, differences of use among the two that we observe in synchrony, support an analysis in terms of polysemy, as opposed to monosemy.
Both the gradual diachronic expansion of the range of uses of both items, and the small, but nevertheless clear, differences of use among the two that we observe in synchrony, seem to us to support an analysis in terms of polysemy, as opposed to monosemy.
As for the diachronic aspect, while we are not claiming that synchronic category structure necessarily recapitulates diachronic development (although nothing, of course, precludes such a state of affairs in principle), it does seem to us that monosemy analyses are called into question if it can be shown that not all the synchronically possible uses of a given lexical item were available at some other diachronic stage of the language.
Essay 2 compares monosemy
, polysemy, and ontology in Plato's Cratylus with Eriugena's and Anselm's assimilations of Plato's doctrines mediated through Calcidius, Macrobius, Martianus Capella, Boethius, and Augustine, and it terminates with insights of Hugh of St.
On the basis of these results it is argued that neither the monosemy nor the multiple meanings approach can fully explain the data, but that the results are best explained by a combination of word learning principles and children's ability to categorize the contextual properties of each sense's use in the ambient language.
This is ambiguity due to vagueness, or monosemy (see Tuggy 1993).
2000 "Lexical 'factes': Between monosemy
and polysemy", in: Susanne Beckmann--Peter Paul Konig--Georg Wolf (eds.
account would be unable to explain the fact that the DM form can have a varying number of functions at different points in time, given that such an account would require all functions to be equally derivable from the same underlying representation.