For a clear explanation of the way in which natural virtue
is elevated while not diluted by Christian faith, see Robert Sokolowski, The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 53-87.
The Christian faith can be interpreted in a manner that moves the question of freedom into a new religious-theological frame without overthrowing the concept of natural virtue
in which the classics are invested.
First, we must distinguish generic religion as a natural virtue
from diverse species of faith that go beyond the duty to render homage to the First Cause.
Finally, hoping to offer an account of the virtues needed for human flourishing today, Michael Lawler and Todd Salzman encourage dialogue between natural virtue
ethics deriving from the Aristotelian tradition and Christian virtue ethics deriving from following Jesus Christ.
A natural virtue
is grounded in our approval, that is, the moral sense's approval, of some naturally occurring motive.
Defining justice as a natural virtue
or admitting the goodness of human beings would solve this problem.
Producers have wised up to the fact that promoting goods by extolling their natural virtue
is a good marketing ploy.
However it seems wrong to argue that the idea of solidarity or mateship in itself should be celebrated as some kind of natural virtue
The position he seeks to overturn is that the reception of Aristotle enabled scholastics to develop a secular basis for political theory, derived from the concept of man as a political animal; thus, justice, understood as serving the common good, became a natural virtue
100] He acknowledged the Stoic definition of "natural virtue
" as deriving simply from natural qualities of body and mind, but he hastened to add that this natural virtue
counted for little in human society, for, as Aristotle had argued, a servant could be endowed with every kind of moral virtue and still not be noble because of his menial social status.
In the course of exploring this thesis, Whiting argues that Aristotle's distinction between the agathos (the good person) and the kaloskagathos (the fine-and-good person) corresponds to his distinction between natural virtue
and authoritative virtue, in which the authoritatively virtuous agent is responsible for his own fate in a way in which the naturally virtuous agent is not.
Nevertheless, Ramsey never wavers on his concentration on results: no matter how achieved, no matter what the motive, natural virtue
is nearly a twin to the real thing when the effects are in view.