neutral monism


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neutral monism

n
(Philosophy) the philosophical doctrine that mind and body are both constructs of the same elements which cannot themselves be classified either as mental or physical. See also monism1
References in periodicals archive ?
These chapters not surprisingly do not cover unified monism (which is so new its omission can be understood), but I think it could have covered appropriately panpsychism (mentioned later in the "Physics" section) and neutral monism.
This paper posits that Cook is right about this, even though it remains unpersuaded by him that Wittgenstein goes wrong because he was committed to Neutral Monism.
For Cook Wittgenstein's central metaphysical theory of neutral monism remained virtually unchanged after 1916.
Cook's second book Wittgenstein: Language and Empiricism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000) built on this interpretative framework by maintaining that the neutral monism which Wittgenstein advocated essentially equated to the sort of phenomenalism which Berkeley propounded.
Arguing that scientists often engage in analysis and evaluation but not synthesis, he presents a systematic approach to building theories and applies Constructics to Bertrand Russell's theory of neutral monism.
Moore and, in a separate paper, with Gottlob Frege, Russell's logicism, his theory of descriptions and his substitutional theory, 'the theory of types', his method of analysis, his neutral monism and his metaphysics of logical atomism, his structuralism and the absolute description of the world, his influence on knowledge by acquaintance to knowledge by causation, an essay on 'Russell, Experience, and the Roots of Science' and finally an essay on 'Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or Unphilosophical Moralist'.
Mumford sees his view as a neutral monism, because, though he identifies the disposition with the categorical base, he gives no ontological priority to one over the other.
Maund's metaphysical diremption of colour in physics and colour in psychology is bound to seem equivocal to those of us who see great merit in the anti-metaphysics of neutral monism, but not only to us.
Wittgenstein's central opinions, namely his advocacy of neutral monism, barely altered after 1916.
being a version of neutral monism, is ontologically parsimonious.
And would not a neutral monism either favor mentalism or paradoxically entail dualism?
They could claim that their theory, being a version of neutral monism, is ontologically parsimonious, but the "oneness" is so qualified by so many ontological parsings that the theory appears to be ontologically bloated.