In the Eubank-Roberge line, the plaintiffs were enfranchised landowners within the district whose land was subject to the district's regulatory powers, whereas in the Salyer-Ball-Kessler line, the plaintiffs were primarily nonlandowners
in the area who were not directly subject to the district's regulatory authority but nevertheless sought the franchise as a matter of equal protection, thus raising a "one person, one vote" issue.
This solution may be pursuing a different notion of fairness, equating at least some landowners (those of the condemned property) with nonlandowners
, who share in general social benefits of a project but reap no enhanced land value.
This is evidenced by the fact that virtually all of the legal challenges brought against neighborhood zoning districts have been initiated by landowners within the district, (180) whereas special assessment districts and BIDs have been beset by litigation from both landowners complaining about their assessments (181) and nonlandowners complaining about being disenfranchised.
I previously mentioned that one distinction between the Eubank-Roberge line and the Salyer-Ball line is that the former group of cases involved challenges by enfranchised landowners who were subject to the districts' regulatory authority, whereas the latter cases involved challenges by nonlandowners who were not directly subject to the districts' coercive authority but sought the franchise on the grounds that the districts' activities affected them.
241) Second, although BIDs and special assessment districts do not formally coerce nonlandowners, they exercise strong de facto coercive authority over nonlandowners within the area.
By contrast, the Salyer-Ball line involved challenges brought by nonlandowners who were not directly subject to the districts' power to coerce mandatory assessments.
The previous Section showed, however, that BIDs and special assessment districts have significant impacts on nonlandowners within their territories, impacts that are in fact qualitatively similar to the coercive effects of zoning regulations.
By contrast, although neighborhood zoning districts may have significant impacts on nonlandowners, such as prospective residents of affordable housing (a point I address in the next Section,) it is unlikely that neighborhood zoning districts will have the kinds of impacts on nonlandowners that BIDs do because they tend to operate in homogeneous residential neighborhoods rather than diverse downtown areas where the interests of tenants, vendors, street people, and other users are often implicated.