polyadic

polyadic

(ˌpɒlɪˈædɪk)
adj
(Mathematics) logic maths (of a relation, operation, etc) having several argument places, as … movesfromto …, which might be represented as Mpox1y1z1t1x2y2z2t2 where p names a person, o an object, and each t a time, and each <x,y,z> the coordinates of a place
[C20: modelled on monadic]
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References in periodicals archive ?
In 1927, Hitchcock [13, 14] proposed the idea of the polyadic form of a tensor, that is, expressing a tensor as a sum of a finite number of rank-one tensors.
This is called the canonical polyadic (CP) decomposition (also known as PARAFAC or CANDECOM).
The behaviour is specified by using a modal logic of actions and a dialect of the polyadic [pi]-calculus.
110) Leibniz's reducibility thesis amounts to something like the following: semantically, all polyadic or two-place predicates are ultimately reducible to monadic or one-place predicates.
This may seem to raise the question whether what's really being claimed here is the impossibility of a purely conceptual representation of infinity, and, since Friedman and others have argued not only that infinity can be given conceptual representation using polyadic or nested quantifiers, but also that Kant turns to intuition to remedy precisely this deficiency in the monadic logic of his day, suddenly much may seem to hang in the balance.
In this section, we include a brief review of the polyadic [pi]-calculus (PPC) [24, 23, 25] and also introduce the specific syntax that we use for it in this paper.
In this section, we present a semantic foundation for Actors in terms of the polyadic [pi]-calculus (PPC).
The subtitle's mention of predication reveals the author's view that facts or states of affairs are nothing over and above particulars having monadic or polyadic universal characteristics.
These differences are found only in the logic of polyadic predication; and this presumably is why Richard Gaskin thinks that they distinguish names from transitive verbs only, and not from verbs generally.
Does he conceive of relations as what philosophers nowadays call many-place or polyadic properties (such as being-taller-than or being-shorter-than, which hold `between' individuals such as Simmias and Socrates)?
It is possible to accept the thesis that all relations are internal and still admit the existence of properties which attach to two or more subjects (what I have been calling many-place or polyadic properties).