57) Yet, none of their statehoods have ever been challenged on these grounds.
As this article argues below, statehood is no longer satisfied through the four traditional criteria of the Montevideo Convention: territory, government, population, and the capacity to engage in international relations.
In Part II1, it will examine the legal theory of statehood in its traditional form.
Moreover, this article argues that the legal theory of statehood should be amended, to incorporate real changes in the existing global understanding of statehood and state sovereignty.
40) What this article argues below is that because of increased globalization of our planet, the legal theory of statehood has undergone profound de facto changes over the last several decades, and that, similar to the examples above, this situation may comprise a Grotian Moment worth more intense scrutiny.
42) In other words, as conceived by the 1933 Montevideo Convention, statehood is a positive legal theory, to be entirely divorced from the political act of state recognition.
However, some support the so-called constitutive view of recognition, under which recognition by outside actors represents one of the main elements of statehood.
While international recognition is no longer widely considered to be a required element of statehood, in practice the ability to exercise the benefits bestowed on sovereign states contained in the Westphalian sovereignty package requires respect of those doctrines and application of them to the state in question by other states in the interstate system.
The legal theory of statehood has produced strange results around the globe.
Second, statehood protects state sovereignty by allowing states to participate in international organizations where major legal and political decisions are undertaken.
A GROTIAN MOMENT: CHANGES IN THE LEGAL THEORY OF STATEHOOD
How has the legal theory of statehood changed through the influence of globalization across our planet?