truth-condition

truth-condition

n
1. (Logic) the circumstances under which a statement is true
2. (Logic) a statement of these circumstances: sometimes identified with the meaning of the statement
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In this kind of semantics we can give the truth-condition of any non-fundamental sentence solely in fundamental terms.
However, the classical approach which holds both that to grasp a proposition is to know its truth-condition and that every proposition is either true or false independently of our being able to tell which, is found to be "irredeemably circular", because it identifies grasping a proposition with having theoretical knowledge of its truth-condition; which is tantamount to saying that to grasp a proposition is to grasp the proposition that says that it is true on such and such condition.
As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition.
He looks the historical context in which the book was written, Bradley's analysis of the truth-conditions of judgments, the problem that his theory is meant to solve, his solution and consequent rejection of the identity between thought and reality, and how the book's arguments shaped his later work and confrontations with such pragmatists as Bertrand Russell.
In support of his reading, Herman invokes a definition of meaning allegedly borrowed from "model-theoretic semantics" (another name for possible-worlds theory): meaning (intension) is "a function from some possible world to the truth-conditions defining the world stipulated to be actual for the purposes of a given (semantic) analysis" (124).
Mental fictionalism is defined as the view according to which we do not actually assert the truth-conditions of the propositional contents of sentences containing mental predicates; rather, we just quasi-assert them.
He once again stresses the important claim that singular expressions are tools for communicating individual concepts, from which it follows that 'the interpretation of singular expressions is constrained to concepts which are taken to denote individuals' (206), and that 'whereas lexical meaning is sensitive to the distinction between individual and other concepts, the truth-conditions of thought are sensitive to distinctions within the class of individual concepts, distinctions to which linguistic meaning is blind' (209).
A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known.
The OP sees semantic competence as the ability to assign truth-conditions to sentences relative to linguistically specified contextual parameters.
How are their truth-conditions to be determined, and how can those truth-conditions be known to be satisfied?
This gives rise to three main rival theories about the truth-conditions for indicative conditionals: (a) materialism, which says that the truth conditions of an indicative conditional match those of the corresponding material conditional; (b) idealism, which does not distinguish truth from assertibility; and (c) nihilism which 'maintains that indicative conditionals .
According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like).