truth-value gap

truth-value gap

n
(Logic) logic the possibility in certain semantic systems of a statement being neither true nor false while also not being determinately of any third truth-value, as all my children are asleep uttered by a childless person
References in periodicals archive ?
So, the indeterminacy we are proposing is not the familiar truth-value gap indeterminacy, proposed by Kripke (1975), Goldstein (1999), Field (2007), Maudlin (2007).
In contrast, for the truth-value gap approach, there is no representation gap, since the ideal representation will represent L in these terms: L is neither true nor false, which is the representation of an alethic property.
This is not the sense of incompleteness to which truth-value gap approaches are committed.
One of the few points of agreement to be found in mainstream responses to the logical and semantic problems generated by vagueness is the view that if any modification of classical logic and semantics is required at all then it will only be such as to admit underdetermined reference and truth-value gaps.
Hart would claim there was a truth-value gap in the law prior to the decision.
37) Depending upon how many and which moral principles are incorporated into the law, and whether the incorporated morality always provides right answers, actual incorporationist positivist legal systems may or may not have truth-value gaps.
Gurus of the truth-value gap are ontologically light-hearted about existential quantifiers.
In particular, the usual understanding of vagueness in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth-value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach.
1966, "Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic", Journal of Philosophy, vol.
If the answer is yes, it can be shown that a contradiction will arise, and we end up in the same predicament in which we found ourselves with the truth-value gaps solution: the Liar sentence cannot be classified within the object language.
It is, we believe, a mistake to think of history-open sentences as introducing truth-value gaps that sometimes need to be filled by so-called supervaluations.
His attention has always been focused on regions of discourse whose statements are clearly "in the market" for truth and falsity but which nonetheless feature local truth-value gaps.