truthlike

truthlike

(ˈtruːθˌlaɪk)
adj
rare resembling the truth
References in classic literature ?
At times monstrous images are created, but the setting and the whole picture are so truthlike and filled with details so delicate, so unexpectedly, but so artistically consistent, that the dreamer, were he an artist like Pushkin or Turgenev even, could never have invented them in the waking state.
According to the first one, the idealizational procedure is "basically a method of transforming raw empirical data into scientific facts," while according to the neo-Weberian one idealization "is basically a method of constructing scientific notions;" the neo-Leibnizian one is a "deliberate falsification which never attempts to be more than truthlike," while according to the neo-Millian one "no mathematical structure fits any piece of reality with full precision, there is always discrepancy between a mathematical formalism and the reality we want to describe.
Idealization is a deliberate falsity which never attempts to be more than truthlike.
Robert Nozick suggests that philosophers will tend to prefer those arguments that leave room for hope; Laura Quinney makes the counterargument that our criteria for truth tend to be literary and that we will thus tend to count what is grimmest as most truthful or truthlike.
And even if it is not claimed to be identical with the relation holding between two theories, one of which is more truthlike than the other, it is meant to be very closely related to the comparative (as distinct from the classificatory and the quantitative) notion of verisimilitude.
And, for purposes of verisimilitude it is normally desirable that the truthlike claims made by a novel should consist not of new and surprising information, but of familiar commonplaces which any reader will know or could verify for himself.
Scientific theories may contain ceteris paribus clauses if (1) without these clauses the constitutive principles are sufficiently truthlike and (2) some detail can be brought to bear as to why the ceteris paribus clauses do not hold up in the face of counter-evidence or failed predictions.
in choosing between rival scientific theories or in the design of a scientific system to support decision-making, a fundamental question in the philosophy of science comes to the fore: when is one theory closer to the truth (more truthlike, or having greater verisimilitude) than another theory?