We may take as one of the best and most typical representatives of this school the Austrian psychologist Brentano, whose "Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint,"* though published in
Like Brentano, I am interested in psychology, not so much for its own sake, as for the light that it may throw on the problem of knowledge.
The view expressed by Brentano has been held very generally, and developed by many writers.
The reference of thoughts to objects is not, I believe, the simple direct essential thing that Brentano and Meinong represent it as being.
Even those, however, which are purely mental will not have that intrinsic reference to objects which Brentano assigns to them and which constitutes the essence of "consciousness" as ordinarily understood.
The topics include Wittgenstein on color exclusion: not fatally mistaken, what is wrong with classical negation, Frege and the description theory: an attempt at rehabilitation, breaking good: whether there is a patent recipe for cooking up the moral pill, and a review of Themes from Brentano
edited by Denis Fisette and Guillaume Frechette.