Davis elaborated, "The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Since then, the Supreme Court has continually referred to Chief Justice Waite
's remarks in Davis' headnote as precedence for corporate personhood.
This group, generally called non-preferentialists or accommodationists, has engaged the historical debate, often arguing that the historical premise in Reynolds was correct--i.e., that Jefferson and Madison can tell us what the religion clauses mean--but asserting that a focus solely on the specific documents unearthed by Chief Justice Waite tell only part of the story, since even those framers had a record of approving some state support for religion.
Chief Justice Waite was not searching for any particular position along the strict separationist-non-preferentialist axis, and none was needed to decide how to apply the free exercise clause to the case of a Mormon polygamist.
Accordingly, Chief Justice Waite identified as one of the six questions to be addressed by the Court: "Should the accused have been acquitted if he married the second time, because he believed it to be his religious duty?"
Chief Justice Waite began his analysis by observing that the First Amendment is in fact implicated by Mr.
Why did Chief Justice Waite elect to employ a "history of the times" methodology to interpret the First Amendment?
Although we do not know why Chief Justice Waite elected to make a foray into constitutional history in Reynolds, we do know where he went to seek out the information he needed--he went next door.
In a four-page brief that she submitted to members of Congress in early 1878, she refuted each item in both Judge Charles Nott's and Chief Justice Waite's denials.
Riddle, Senator Aaron Sargent, Judge Charles Nott, Chief Justice Waite, and Samuel R.