The general point, then, is that Chomskyan
competence theories are accounts of implicit knowledge that are pitched at a level of abstraction that makes no commitment to particular algorithms or implementations, and that also idealize the nature of a competent speaker and her language faculty.
What unites cultures is not the neutral, universal set of meanings that Chomskyan
linguists are trying to establish; you don't find it at that level.
And more generally, what is the impact of Chomskyan
and Greenbergian approaches upon the current typological research?
However, even Katz & Postal (apparently in discomfort with the Chomskyan
enterprise) present their position as the only alternative to conceptualism, which makes it a two-sided problem, independently of the (re)actions of the actors involved.
John Collins concentrates in his chapter on the more recent changes in the generative paradigm but also looks at the constant threads in Chomskyan
linguistics--autonomy of language and syntax, naturalism and internalism, where internalism is 'a thesis about states of the brain theoretically individuated to enter into an explanation of stable linguistic phenomena' (176).
linguistics tells us that all language is structured in an almost unthinkably complex manner, quite independently of any "signified" world towards which it appears to point.
The theory of binding has instigated a lot of empirical research aiming to substantiate Chomskyan
innateness claims, and the role of Universal Grammar in language acquisition.
EC has also had a surprisingly powerful and wide influence in the contemporary human sciences and formal sciences: for example, in literary studies, history and history of science, women's studies and gender studies, ethnicity and race studies, film studies, sociology, human anthropology, Chomskyan
and Whorfian linguistics alike, cognitive psychology, intuitionist mathematics, and non-classical (or "deviant") logic.
types of ideas concerning formal and/or functional grammatical categories (Pinker, 1994) are less accepted in the sense that their supposed genetic origins and cerebral underpinnings remain as mysterious as they were when first proposed (Tomasello, 1995; Rondal, 2006a), they can not be completely ruled out on the basis of the available information.
In short, the more fundamental cognitive aspects of human knowing and acting, understood (in the Chomskyan
sense, for instance) as 'competence', are not worldview-bound, but rather they constitute or provide the very conditions for the formation of any particular worldview.
Since the Chomskyan
derivational theory of complexity was put to the test in laboratory-based studies, and proved wrong (Fodor and Garrett 1967; Johnson-Laird 1974; see Tannenhaus 1988, for a review), till recently, psycholinguists have generally steered clear of any direct dependence on the postulates of linguistic theory (by which they usually mean generative grammar), and linguists, also till recently, have been wary enough to make their analyses dependent on empirical refutation in laboratories.