However, these cannot be cognizing agent and cognized object unless there is an act of cognition, so that the entities in question cannot truly have the properties of being cognizor
(pramdtrtva) and object of cognition (prameyatva).
The present paper, however, is concerned with the concept of consciousness as the "cognizor" of objects (e.g., internal and external events) and the fallacy that occurs when a shift from the term "consciousness" to "states of consciousness" is accompanied by a confusion of consciousness with the content of consciousness.
Theories of SSCs, for example, would be enhanced by supplanting the term "shamanic states of consciousness" with "shamanic patterns of phenomenal properties." Theories containing the consciousness/content fallacy would need to be revised to avoid fallacious contentions such as consciousness is simultaneously: (1) the "cognizor" of shifts in, for instance, "subjective experience"; and (2) the shifts in "subjective experience" themselves.