Since to predicate it of anything is to represent a as being F or b as being G, the disjunctive proposition
that a is F or b is G can be identified with the proposition that predicates this property of a and b (or perhaps, of everything).
Thus, the inconvenience that the use of the brackets causes would disappear and it could be claimed that, for the Stoics, the real structure of a [phrase omitted] (disjunctive proposition) such as [phrase omitted] A [phrase omitted] B [phrase omitted] [GAMMA] [phrase omitted] [DELTA] is actually:
So, based on all of this, it can be said that the [phrase omitted] was very different from the disjunctive proposition in standard logic.
In the disjunctive situation discussed in this article, the fact finder can conclude that a disjunctive proposition
is more likely true than false even though it is persuaded that each of the alternatives constituting the disjunction, or any subset of them, is more likely false than true.
He carries his argument further by means of two disjunctive propositions
. The Stoics defined a disjunctive proposition
as |one which is disjoined by the disjunctive connective "either".
This allows a very high-level view of logics, and it prompts philosophical questions, like whether there are any genuinely disjunctive propositions
. Then the class D is special iff, roughly, a logic treats members of D differently than other formulas of the language (the exact definition is on page 1302).