eliminative materialism

(redirected from Eliminativism)

eliminative materialism

or

eliminativism

n
(Philosophy) (in philosophy of mind) the theory that people's common-sense understanding of the mind is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist
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References in periodicals archive ?
But it is not so for some interpreters of Wittgenstein, such as Travis, and for all those who Recanati refers to as proponents of 'Meaning Eliminativism' (Recanati, 2003)--for it is their contention that to which things a predicate can be applied depends upon the interests of the participants.
The movement to eliminate race is known as racial eliminativism (Curry, 2009b).
In order to achieve this goal, he analyzes three views on the logical form of exemplification, namely, Gustav Bergmann's logical realism, Wilfrid Sellars's metalinguistic expressivism, and Javier Cumpa's logical eliminativism. He starts by examining the account advanced by Bergmann in his 1960 essay "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method," according to which the logical form of exemplification is represented by the juxtaposition of logical signs in a sentence.
He took a stand against Osgood and Skinner's behaviorism, Piaget's constructivism, Gibson's ecological perception, connectionist models and Churchland's neuroscientific eliminativism, Block's semantic holism, Pinker's massive modularity, and even the explanatory excesses of natural selection in the theory of evolution (Darwin).
In particular, taking ordinary objects to be modally fine-grained plays a central role in leading Sidelle to endorse modal conventionalism, Korman to endorse rationalism, Thomasson to endorse a heavily intentional account of language, and Heller and van Inwagen to endorse eliminativism about ordinary objects.
The big problem with Incomplete Nature is that it systematically avoids engaging its only real empirical competitor, some kind of interpretivism or eliminativism. As a committed naturalist, Deacon needs to acknowledge that we could simply be confusing differences in signal with differences in being.
The main claim of restrictivism is that there is no cognitive phenomenology, and so what we are looking at is a form of cognitive phenomenology eliminativism. This is to be distinguished from phenomenal eliminativist views simpliciter on the grounds that the latter deny any presence of phenomenology when consciously thinking, while the former just denies the presence of cognitive phenomenology when consciously thinking, something that will be relevant for our discussion in section 3.2.
The author has organized the main body of his text in seven chapters focused on aisthesis, the consequences of panpsychism, panpsychism and eliminativism, the universe of things, and other related subjects.
we might think of it as a kind of eliminativism, since it denies the
In "Philosophy Raced, Philosophy Erased," Charles Mills decries the "whiteness of philosophy" and the "conceptual tokenization" of Black philosophers (54), critiquing Kwame Anthony Appiah's racial eliminativism (52-53); John Rawls' and left-Rawlsians' ostensibly race-less ideal theory (54); Philip Pettit's white solipsism (61-63); and reflecting on his own philosophical production and reception, particularly of his book The Racial Contract.