The kind of "intentional mental state
" (244), upon which he predominantly focuses, is what Eder calls the "perceptual perspective." He thus neglects "epistemic," "evaluative," "motivational," and "emotional" (244) perspective, aspects that are interrelated with (quasi-)perceptual aspects of characters' consciousness anyway.
2011) (noting that defendant may possess an intentional mental state
with respect to one victim while simultaneously possessing a reckless mental state with respect to another) (citing People v.
By chapter five, Okrent is prepared to reveal one of his leading ideas, that of instrumental rationality: "When the goal-directed acts of an agent are explained by appeal to the contents of the agent's intentional mental states
, we say that the agent has reasons for what she does and that the agent exercises instrumental rationality." Living organisms capable of goal-directed behavior without displaying the existence of any beliefs or desires do not act rationally.
Brueckner and Ebbs argue that anti-individualism implies that the thoughts that a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about her social and physical environments: a thinker's external physical and social environment partly determines the semantic properties of his words and sentences, and the contents of his intentional mental states
. Arguments for anti-individualism show that in ordinary situations when skepticism is not in question there is no distance between a speaker's sincere utterance of a sentence that expresses a particular content and the speaker's thereby expressing a mental state of his with that content.
McIntyre points out that Searle sees a close connection between philosophy of language and philosophy of mind: Intentional mental states
and speech acts share certain central features by virtue of which both are Intentional.
The ability to mentalize is a normal developmental achievement, he noted, and it refers to perceiving and interpreting the behavior of others in terms of intentional mental states
such as beliefs, goals, and desires.
He argues that culpability is concerned exclusively with the intentional mental states
people have when they act, and that intended evil is never less blameworthy than unintended evil.
A second purpose is to suggest that the application of the argument is in fact very much wider than the case of phenomenal properties or qualia upon which both Nagel and Jackson focus, that it applies just as well to the content of intentional mental states
, and to the general phenomenon of consciousness itself.