By chapter five, Okrent is prepared to reveal one of his leading ideas, that of instrumental rationality: "When the goal-directed acts of an agent are explained by appeal to the contents of the agent's intentional mental states
, we say that the agent has reasons for what she does and that the agent exercises instrumental rationality.
Brueckner and Ebbs argue that anti-individualism implies that the thoughts that a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about her social and physical environments: a thinker's external physical and social environment partly determines the semantic properties of his words and sentences, and the contents of his intentional mental states
McIntyre points out that Searle sees a close connection between philosophy of language and philosophy of mind: Intentional mental states
and speech acts share certain central features by virtue of which both are Intentional.
The ability to mentalize is a normal developmental achievement, he noted, and it refers to perceiving and interpreting the behavior of others in terms of intentional mental states
such as beliefs, goals, and desires.
He argues that culpability is concerned exclusively with the intentional mental states
people have when they act, and that intended evil is never less blameworthy than unintended evil.
A second purpose is to suggest that the application of the argument is in fact very much wider than the case of phenomenal properties or qualia upon which both Nagel and Jackson focus, that it applies just as well to the content of intentional mental states
, and to the general phenomenon of consciousness itself.