Biggar strongly defends it, noting that a hallmark of distinctively Christian ethics is its attention to the intentional state
of the actor--an emphasis that reaches all the way back to the Sermon on the Mount.
imply an intentional state
of mind, rather than one where a certain
A de re belief or a visual experience for that matter can be fully characterized in terms of its content, while the content of an Intentional state
determines its conditions of satisfaction.
In principle, a mental intentional state
could be "made" of various stuffs--the only constraint on the kind of stuff that realizes it is that it enables the state to bear the required relation to its intentional object.
All such stories seem to be designed to give the exceptional behavior meaning in a manner that implicates both an intentional state
in the protagonist (a belief or desire) and some canonical element in the culture .
The psychological implication of this semantic proposal is to identify a propositional attitude the existence of which makes true the ascription of any intentional state
by means of an intensional transitive.
16) The default level of fault under the Code is recklessness (17)--an intentional state
consisting of the conscious disregard of a known risk.
Taking the intentional stance is entering into an intentional state
It is an inner act that constitutes the initial point of an intentional state
Bentham failed to perceive any conflict between consequentialism and the requirement of mens rea--the essentially retributivist construction of fault as an intentional state
on the occasion of wrongdoing--because his rationalistic conception of deterrence led him to believe that nonintentional wrongdoing, including negligence, could not be deterred in any case.
8) The content of an intentional state
may fit, or fail to fit, how things are.
But, despite the tendency in some writers simply to equate truth conditional content with broad content, I think (and this is the contentious part) that we should accept that there is narrow, truth conditional content--intentional states
per se are not broad--and, what is more, that whenever someone is in an intentional state
with broad content, what makes it true that they are in such a state is the combination of the narrow intentional state
they are in with certain connections between that narrow state and their surroundings, including especially the causal origin of the narrow state.