The second chapter provides an overview of the political history and contours of state tradition and ideology from
Kemalism to coup d'etat to Turkey's current political scenario.
With popular support significantly derived from its charisma in rural and some parts of Turkey,
Kemalism has been defeated by Erdoganism.
However, the victory of
Kemalism implemented by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk that gave Turkey subsequent territorial gains led to the renegotiation of this treaty and the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923 with no mention of a future Kurdish state.
That was until the Sunni Islamist Justice & Development Party (AKP) came to power in late 2002 and gradually weakened Turkey's secular movement named
Kemalism.
Because Western observers were supportive of the secular nature of
Kemalism, many overlooked that the regime was more similar to European fascism in the 1930s-a nationalistic one-party state with Ataturk himself at the apex of a personality cult-than to liberal democracy.
Private businesses of this category, which used to be quite powerful before AKP's advent to the government in late 2002, follow the tradition of venerating Ataturk, the secular founder of modern Turkey and
Kemalism, who died in 1938.
But Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has improved his relationship with the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), considered to bastion of secular
Kemalism (thus named after Ataturk).
Discoursing heavily on national and local values while exacting revenge on both the West and
Kemalism, the crowd talked about the importance of "the revolution" not only for the country as a whole but for the Muslim world and even the rest of the world.
This transformation centers on what the author describes as the end of
Kemalism as the Turkish guiding ideology.
As many, particularly the poor, have come to associate
Kemalism and secular ideologies with repression, so they have often looked to religious parties to express their disaffection.
As a result and just as bad Erdogan's politics have hit the economy, Turkey's economic problems are forcing him to reverse course by (a) halting support for the MB and the rest of political Islam, with Gulen's intrigues at home having taught him a hard lesson; (b) consolidating his recent peace overtures to the country's powerful military, the guardian of secular
Kemalism; and (c) leaning more resolutely on the Saudi-led block to help bail his country's financial sector out through FDI and cash deposits, with Ankara urging GCC banks to open branches in a quietly re-secularising republic, and his Finance Minister is offering favourable terms (see down20WhoMay19-14).
The third one, promulgated in 1982, was drawn up under military rule and gave great powers to the generals as being the defenders of
Kemalism, curbed individual rights and largely ignored Turkey's minorities, including the Alevis and Kurds.