However, Schlutz argues that by simply revaluing that same understanding of the faculty that Descartes and Kant had sought to marginalize, Fichte does not resolve the problematic relationship of the imagination to philosophical foundation, but simply displaces this problem into a new dichotomy between (good) imagination and (bad) "fantasy." Von Hardenberg's "magical idealism
," by contrast, does not seek to "base the self on a static first principle at all, but rather describes imagination as a dynamic force guaranteeing the unity of the self as an organic whole of interconnected elements without a stable organizing center" (9-10).
(1) He never developed the idea of magical realism, preferring the related concept, magical idealism. In the 1920s magical realism reappeared in Germany in the art-historical criticism of Franz Roh and in the political philosophy of Ernst Junger, and also in Italy in the work of the critic and writer Massimo Bontempelli.
This idealism of the absolute subject constitutes a useful starting-point for understanding the conceptual motivation behind Novalis's magical idealism.