Müller-Lyer illusion

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Müller-Lyer illusion

(ˈmuːləˈlaɪə)
n
(Psychology) an optical illusion in which a line with inward pointing arrowheads is seen as longer than an equal line with outward pointing arrowheads
[C19: named after Franz Müller-Lyer (1857–1916), German sociologist and psychiatrist]
References in periodicals archive ?
The subject knows with certainty that the lines generating the Muller-Lyer illusion are equal, but continues to see one as longer than the other.
Using the Muller-Lyer illusion line figure (figure 1) engraved in black on white traffolyte, six slide rule illusion figures were made to form two sets of display conditions.
The Muller-Lyer illusion or "confluxion paradox" is perhaps the most famous of all geometrical visual optical illusions (Boring, 1942).
Therefore, the perceptual appearance of the Muller-Lyer illusion needs a different kind of explanation.
Because of that, here, we apply two procedures to estimate the AM component of images of the Muller-Lyer illusion and then we compare the results obtained with each one.
Malott, Malott, and Pokrzywinski (1967) and Malott and Malott (1970) have addressed the Muller-Lyer illusion in pigeons.
There is an argument over whether the Ponzo illusion is a depth/space/perspective illusion or a variant of the Muller-Lyer illusion. That is, the extent to which rotation of a display reduces the illusion is interpreted as evidence that the illusion is a perspective illusion, whereas the extent to which rotation of the display does not reduce the illusion is interpreted as evidence that the illusion is a case of the Muller-Lyer illusion.
The hypothesis, that accurate length perception depends on congruent spatial anchor cues, thus also predicted a reduction in the Muller-Lyer illusion with additional spatial reference cues for the length inputs.
The hypotheses were that the Muller-Lyer illusion is reduced or eliminated by using landmarks and/or by scanning relative to an external frame.
(Of course, there have been those sceptical of distinguishing experience from the beliefs to which it gives rise, but Currie's comments on the Muller-Lyer illusion (p.
The best argument Fodor has going for him here is that perceptual illusions typically persist in tricking us even when we know that they are illusions and even when we have a cognitive theory to explain how the trickery works: "it's past of the |background theory' of anybody who lives in this culture and is at all into pop psychology that [the Muller-Lyer illusion is] in fact misleading and that it always turns out, on measurement, that the center lines of the arrows are the same length" (p.