noncognitivism

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noncognitivism

(ˌnɒnˈkɒɡnɪtɪˌvɪzəm)
n
(Philosophy) philosophy the semantic meta-ethical thesis that moral judgments do not express facts and so do not have a truth value, thus excluding both naturalism and non-naturalism. See emotivism, prescriptivism
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Conativism adds to non-cognitivism by also making a claim about what normative judgments are: desires.
NATURALISM AND NON-COGNITIVISM IN ROSS S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
The account highlights the clash between cognitivism and non-cognitivism, the role of science vis-a-vis aesthetic judgment, and the burgeoning of philosophical writing in the field.
Elsewhere McDowell calls this variously "Platonism," "The View from Sideways On," and "The View of Rules as Rails." See McDowell, "Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following," in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, ed.
The essays treat the following topics: Nietzsche's views on or relationship to aesthetics (essays 1-3), metaethics, (specifically, non-cognitivism and fictionalism) (essays 4-5), compassion and the self (essays 6-8), and naturalism (essay 9).
Smith provides a powerful non-cognitive standard appropriateness and inappropriateness for aesthetics (his moral theory fits well with non-cognitivism).
There is a classic debate in moral philosophy between cognitivism and non-cognitivism with regard to the truth-value of moral claims.
More explicitly: does non-cognitivism in moral philosophy lead to a practical nihilism?
of Helsinki) analyzes a variety of points of view and sources to support a pragmatic moral realism, serving to continue recent efforts to break down traditional categories of thought, challenging excessively naturalistic and nationalistic moral realisms and challenging the standoff between moral cognitivism and moral non-cognitivism. He describes the many faces of moral realism, the complexities of moral problems as personal problems, the truth in skepticism, metaphilosophical perspectives on pragmatist metaethics, and the effect on and of wonder and trust.
The cognitivism/ non-cognitivism debate has focused on whether moral judgments have truth values in the ordinary sense.
softened their views to the point that non-cognitivism has become but
(1) See, for example, Michael Smith, "Five Not-Much Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics," unpublished manuscript.
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