n.1.The state or quality of being ordinal.
Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, published 1913 by G. & C. Merriam Co.
References in periodicals archive ?
The present paper builds on recent contributions to the history of utility theory in five ways: First and most broadly, the narrative below parallels recent discussions which emphasize important philosophical differences between Lionel Robbins and his predecessors from Smith and Hume to Edgeworth as a key explanation for the post-1932 rise of ordinalism. (3) While there is much merit in this view, we argue here that even aside from Robbins' issues with utilitarian philosophy, there were other forces that also played an important role, coming as much from mathematics as from philosophy.
Fifth, we also discuss the important role that the young Rosenstein-Rodan appears to have played in stimulating the seminal contribution of Hicks and Allen (1934) (in the process apparently conveying some of the views on ordinalism that he had picked up from Voigt to Hicks and Allen), revealing a heretofore underappreciated contribution by Rosenstein-Rodan to the development of modern utility and demand theory.
In this regard, the early literature on ordinalism by Hicks and Allen (1934), Lange (1934) and Hicks (1939) all referred extensively to the Manuel.
However, complexities associated with the greater range of additional issues addressed in Pareto's post-'Sunto' studies contributed to a diminution of his emphasis on ordinalism in economic theory.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 38-42 (1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L.
(94.) See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L.
12-13: see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L.
Still, because rough interpersonal comparison is both useful and compelling in certain contexts, we might welcome a variant of the Benthamite value theory that could combine ordinalism with rough interpersonal comparisons.
The problems touched on by her are treated in this way in sections II, Ill and IV on the concept of material welfare and ordinalism, aggregate concepts, and interpersonal comparisons of utility respectively.
Robbins's argument was confined to a few brief statements on the general principle of ordinalism [36, 56, 75] which he learnt particularly from Wicksteed and the Austrians [40, 103-4; 28, 159-60].
No, of course not, since that will go against both non-comparability and ordinalism. Can we then distinguish the rich as those who happen to have more income, or more consumer goods (nothing about utility need be said), and bring this recognition to bear in social judgements?
In sections Ill to V, therefore, I address material welfare, ordinalism, and interpersonal comparisons as value judgments.