private language

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private language

n
(Philosophy) philosophy a language that is not merely secret or accidentally limited to one user, but that cannot in principle be communicated to another
References in periodicals archive ?
Last Rites for the Private Language Argument, GEOFFREY MADELL
Wittgenstein in this suite of comments accordingly makes explicit at least a main part of the philosophical grammatical connection between rule-following and the private language argument:
In his earlier treatment of the remarks on private language (Wittgenstein, Routledge, 1976, 1987), Fogelin located the central move of the private language argument in PI 202: if language is essentially a rule governed activity, and it's impossible to follow a rule privately because following a rule is a custom or practice, then a private language is impossible.
The only weakness to be found is in the latter portion of the book where the author could have delved deeper into Locke's individualistic private language argument and its generation of moral language--especially important for Locke's political philosophical thought; Locke's critique of words is most essential in this regard.
Wittgenstein's private language argument is well known and thought effective in arguing against the possibility of a private language.
In the chapter "Sensations and the Soul," Brenner goes to the heart of Wittgenstein's private language argument. On his reading, interpreting words for sensations as designating objects that one could point to inwardly in the interest of defending a conception of privacy renders the identity of the alleged mental objects irrelevant.
This new understanding of language in turn implies a new conception of meaning and philosophical method, both of which are perhaps most prominently displayed in what has come to be known as the private language argument.
His rendering of the private language argument, for example--according to which the reason there is no distinction between correct and incorrect uses of the private linguist's sign "S" is not merely that the private linguist cannot check that his use of "S" accords with the meaning he originally conferred upon it, but that he failed by means of his inner ostensive definition to confer a meaning on it in the first place--is to be found in various other writers.
But then, what about the likewise endless disputes about what Quine means by the indeterminacy of translation or what Wittgenstein's private language argument amounts to?
Austin do not appear at all, while Wittgenstein's arguments appear only intermittently or not at all, such as the private language argument. Although McGinn concisely explicates Russell's view that ordinary language misleads us into making logical errors, such as confusing definite descriptions and names, he only briefly mentions Wittgenstein's criticism of the Russellian project: "The formation of this logical language led to the idea that natural language was adequate for practical purposes but deficient for logical ones.
Wittgenstein's private language argument is built on how people acquire and use language in ways appropriate to their relationships.
There are also those that appear to be philosophical claims, such as the ones that make up the so-called private language argument, use-theory of meaning, and doctrine of family resemblance.