propositional attitude


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propositional attitude

n
(Philosophy) logic philosophy a relation between a person and a proposition, such as belief, desire, intention, etc
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Given that propositional attitude reports have a role in the explanation of actions and other mental states, and that this role may be lost if failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms embedded in the 'that'-clauses is denied, not only should a successful account of propositional attitude reports respect failures of substitutivity, but it should also say what that explanatory role consists in.
subject adopts a propositional attitude to the proposition that S iff
Gluer goes on to discuss John McDowell's objection that experience is a kind of propositional attitude. The chapter concludes with a useful account of Davidson's triangulation argument(s) for the claim that "the content of perceptual belief is determined by a triangle formed by two sentient creatures and an object (or event) in the world."
Whereas Gomez-Torrente focuses on my account of natural kind terms, and predicates containing them, Ezcurdia focuses on my account of names and indexicals, with special emphasis on their behavior in the content clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions.
Wright advances a minimalist conception of truth-aptitude: a class of sentences is apt to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity so long as the sentences in question satisfy syntactic constraint -- "are capable of significant embedding within constructions such as negation, the conditional, and in contexts of propositional attitude -- and disciplinary constraints -- [their] use is subject to acknowledged standards of warrant" (p.
Entertaining As a Propositional Attitude: A Nonreductive Characterization, URIAH KRIEGEL
Desire is a state with an intentional content while a situation-liking is "not a representational state", it "is a feeling rather than a propositional attitude" (p.
However, because of the pervasive context-sensitivity of propositional attitude ascriptions, the question what it is possible to know a priori concerning a given object will have very different answers in different contexts.
Sincerity is a matter of connecting a speech act with the processes governing its corresponding propositional attitude. Since the connection is to the process, not the deep attitude itself, the standard of sincerity is surprisingly low.
The structure of the book is as follows: In Chapter 1, Hossack articulates the thesis that knowledge is a fundamental, primitive relation that obtains between a mind and a fact in the world, rather than a propositional attitude. In Chapter 2, a quasi-Tractarian metaphysics of facts is developed.
As such, (SD) predicts that expressives will typically resist embedding under propositional attitude reports, verbs of saying, etc.
The author's understanding of fictionalism does not involve solely a propositional attitude but a broader stance, which may include certain acts of pretense.