Particularly relevant example might be so-called The Rapacki Plan
from 1957 that called for creating a non-nuclear zone in Poland, and both Western and Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia and it was proposed by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Rapacki in Wladyslaw Gomulka's government (9).
(4) Neither the Soviet suggestion nor the Polish proposal (named Rapacki Plan
after the Polish foreign minister, Adam Rapacki) made any progress due to the mutual suspicion and hostility that characterized the Cold War era, and the fear that the Polish proposal (Poland was a Soviet satellite when it made this proposal) strongly favored the Soviet bloc by removing the ability of the US to use nuclear weapons if the then vastly superior Red Army swept into western Europe.
Moscow had initially attempted to use diplomacy in the form of the Rapacki Plan
to head off German proliferation.
Victor Feske's excellent essay on the French and British foreign-policymaking establishments during the Suez Crisis reveals the professional diplomats' isolation from the prime ministers in both countries, and Piotr Wandycz's fascinating study of the 1957 Rapacki plan
for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe points to a surprising element of diplomatic maneuver within the Warsaw Pact.