For a definition of rationalizability
, see Chapter 4 of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
Rather, it has been shown that the precise implication of common knowledge of the game structure and rationality of the agents is rationalizability
, a weaker concept than Nash equilibrium .
Roberts, 1990, Rationalizability
, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games With Strategic Complementarities, Econometrica, 58: 1255-1277.
(109) To put it another way, the rationalizability
of sex-dependent workplace-presentation rules must depend on the idea that, even granting that sex and gender or gender-performance can be conceptually disaggregated, (110) we nevertheless have reason to maintain a state of affairs in which sex and gender remain linked as a matter of fact--i.e., a state of affairs in which biological males behave in masculine ways and biological females behave in feminine ways.
, learning, and equilibrium m games with strategic complementarities.
(17) In game theory it is common to use the term "rationalizability
" rather than "rationality" because in principle it is possible that there are several different strategies with different payoffs that can be rationalized in the above described sense.
After all, if it turned out that doing that which one has most reason to do (performative rationality) were equivalent with doing that for which, in retrospect, one will find most reason to have done (rationalizability
) then the pursuit of rationalizability
will have the same substantive consequences as the pursuit of rationality.
(30) This dissatisfaction first appeared in the definition of what was ostensibly a new solution concept: "rationalizability
." See B.
The relevant game theoretic notions of dominance and rationalizability
If we require only that it is common knowledge that each player maximizes expected utility relative to internally consistent beliefs, we have the solution concept of rationalizability
. But for many games, rationalizability
does not identify a unique solution.
In contrast, rationalizability
makes much weaker predictions, and does not distinguish between any outcomes that cannot be excluded by common knowledge of rationality.
of a choice rule is equivalent to the Pareto property (if an allocation is preferred by all, then it is implemented).