94) Justice White, writing for the four Justices in the Rule of Reasonist minority, allied himself, conversely, with the views of the defendants, the lower court judges, and Sherman's rhetorical foes in the congressional debates.
Peritz concludes that the dissenting Rule of Reasonist faction was haunted chiefly by a distinctly different general fear, the Hobbesian specter of a potential descent into anarchic industrial warfare.
114) In this connection, says Peritz, Peckham appealed to the "liberal sensibilities" of the Rule of Reasonist faction by arguing that the federal government legitimately could block not only state interference with interstate commerce, but also similar interference with interstate commerce arising from private associational activity like the cartel challenged in Addyston Pipe.
THE SECOND CYCLE Peritz believes that despite the early establishment of High Court unanimity in cartel cases and continuing changes in Court membership, the Supreme Court continued to be divided into a "free competition" Literalist faction and a "freedom of contract" Rule of Reasonist faction up through 1911, not only in antitrust cases but in its jurisprudence more generally.
Peritz explains Peckham's "desertion to the Rule of Reasonist faction" on the basis of Peckham's continuing, but now differently focused, commitment to liberty.
In contrast, Peritz argues, Chief Justice White and other members of the Court's Rule of Reasonist faction fundamentally wanted to protect individual rights of liberty and property.
Miles the Rule of Reasonist faction went along with "the Court's Literalist holding that price-fixing is illegal per se"(156) because its members, in line with contemporary classical economics in general, did not distinguish between rivalry among sellers operating at the same level in a distribution chain and rivalry between a manufacturer and its retailers.
Factional accommodation facilitated by a formal assumption of equality In short, Peritz finds that the Supreme Court's antitrust and constitutional law jurisprudence through 1911 arose out of confrontations and accommodations between a "Literalist faction" devoted to "a commercial egalitarianism expressed in the rhetorics of industrial liberty and free competition" and a "Rule of Reasonist faction" that was committed to limited government and used freedom of contract rhetoric and energetic judicial review to further that commitment.
Peritz, however, explains the case instead as a sudden factional membership crisis within a still continuing context of contention between a Literalist and a Rule of Reasonist camp.
He finds, however, that two of the key original founders of that camp, Justices Peckham and Brewer, now "abandon[ed] their Literalist colleagues for the Rule of Reasonist camp[.
The posited Rule of Reasonist package, on the other hand, offered forceful affirmation of the importance of private property rights, freedom of contract and freedom of association, a tempered commitment to competition as the rule of trade, and pointed concern to prevent the onset of either statism or anarchic social warfare.
Peritz associates Holmes with the Rule of Reasonist faction(181) because of his dissent from Harlan's Literalist condemnation of the combination of two major railroads through the holding company challenged in Northern Securities.