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 (rĕp′rĭ-zĕn-tā′shə-nəl, -zən-)
Of or relating to representation, especially to realistic graphic representation.

rep′re·sen·ta′tion·al·ism n.


(ˌrɛprɪzɛnˈteɪʃənəˌlɪzəm) or


1. (Philosophy) philosophy the doctrine that in perceptions of objects what is before the mind is not the object but a representation of it. Compare presentationism, naive realism See also barrier of ideas
2. (Art Terms) fine arts the practice or advocacy of attempting to depict objects, scenes, figures, etc, directly as seen
ˌrepresenˌtationalˈistic adj
ˌrepresenˈtationist n, adj


the practice of creating recognizable figures, objects, and natural forms in art. Cf. Abstractism.
See also: Art
References in periodicals archive ?
Tying the Knot: Why Representationalists Should Endorse the Sensorimotor Theory of Conscious Feel, DAVID SILVERMAN
For this purpose, representationalists with naturalistic inclinations typically appeal to teleological theories of mental content.
Nor am I directly aware only of an inner content--an appearance--that is independent of the external object, as many representationalists have held.
Consequently, categorizing analytic philosophers as representationalists and pragmatists as inferentialists proves unhelpful if we hope to encourage open dialogue across the two traditions.
Inspired by the work of Descartes and Locke, sense-data representationalists think that there must be some explanation for the regularities that we find at the immediate subjective level of visual experience.
The participants in these debates fall into two principal, largely self-defined groups: representationalists and anti-representationalists.
Representationalists believe that sensory data is completely unconceptualized; the human mind must filter this undifferentiated stuff through concepts before it can be understood as anything, as red or smooth or as an object such as a cup or ball.
Representationalists typically think that controversies
Try to imagine how the gardens of Fairfield Porter comprehend their "historical moments," and you'll see how some representationalists have so much more to give than others.
Representationalists divide over one big question: what sort of intentional content is qualitative character to be identified with -- narrow or wide, internal or external?
Similar appeals to examples of mediated perception are made by other modern representationalists like Ayer[15] and O'Shaughnessy,[16] and also by classical representationalists such as Arnauld.
Likewise, representationalists in philosophy of mind, such as Fodor, hold that thoughts are sentences (or sentence-like entities) that, qua representations, bear truth-conditions.

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