The difference, to put the same point in slightly different terms, is that if "a" and "b" are rigid designators, then a = b [right arrow] a = b, given the transworld modality of identity that is built into Kripke's concept of rigid designation
of Newfoundland, Canada) begins by emphasizing the importance of rigid designation
to various issues in the philosophy of language, then argues that once Bertrand Russell's take on ordinary names is set aside, there is something characteristically Russellian about the Kripke-Kaplan model-savvy developments in the theory of reference.
As is appropriate, given his own contributions to the existing literature, Linsky goes fairly deeply into the semantics of general terms, and into recent debates as to how the notion of rigid designation
should be defined for the case of general terms.
Zizek parts company with Derrida and Butler (and me) when he grafts Kripkean rigid designation
onto the Lacanian "real," which stands outside reality as a threat of unintelligibility.
The rivalry is old: two-stage theory seeks the effect of direct reference, introduced by Kripke as rigid designation
, and Dummett (1981a, 1981b) appeals to scope to oppose Kripke's argument that proper names, as rigid, differ from definite descriptions in how they refer.
With this in mind, Chapters 5 through 7 address the topics of proper names, fictional entities, and natural kind terms, taking pains to show that notions like rigid designation
and truth in fiction can be accommodated or replaced without appeal to possible worlds.
In order to make the minimal rigid designation
work, one has to presuppose an essentialist version of haecceitism.
These points justify taking a predicate or general term to be rigid iff it is essentialist, thereby extending the notion of a rigid designation
to include these expressions, as well as singular terms.
In Gallois 1986 I developed an account of rigid designation
which was designed to make room for the contingency of identities.
This seems to suggest the purely denotative character of names, a point that has been interpreted as in line with the causal account and its emphasis on rigid designation
Peirce dissociated meaning (which he assumed to be conceptual) from reference, but did not propose a concept of rigid designation
Murali Ramachandran and I are agreed that there is away to block the objection he raised in Ramachandran (1992) to the account of rigid designation
and contingent identity I gave in Gallois (1986).