rigid designator

(redirected from Rigid designation)

rigid designator

n
(Logic) logic an expression that identifies the same individual in every possible world: for example, "Shakespeare" is a rigid designator since it is possible that Shakespeare might not have been a playwright but not that he might not have been Shakespeare
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References in periodicals archive ?
According to the logic of rigid designation, every historical moment,
The difference, to put the same point in slightly different terms, is that if "a" and "b" are rigid designators, then a = b [right arrow] []a = b, given the transworld modality of identity that is built into Kripke's concept of rigid designation. This trivializes either Kripke's K(Q-W) as a proof of the necessity of rigidly designative identities and identity statements, Kripke's unspecified concept of []-necessity, or his category of rigid designation.
of Newfoundland, Canada) begins by emphasizing the importance of rigid designation to various issues in the philosophy of language, then argues that once Bertrand Russell's take on ordinary names is set aside, there is something characteristically Russellian about the Kripke-Kaplan model-savvy developments in the theory of reference.
As is appropriate, given his own contributions to the existing literature, Linsky goes fairly deeply into the semantics of general terms, and into recent debates as to how the notion of rigid designation should be defined for the case of general terms.
Finally, Kripke and the concept of "rigid designation" is presented.
Zizek parts company with Derrida and Butler (and me) when he grafts Kripkean rigid designation onto the Lacanian "real," which stands outside reality as a threat of unintelligibility.
The rivalry is old: two-stage theory seeks the effect of direct reference, introduced by Kripke as rigid designation, and Dummett (1981a, 1981b) appeals to scope to oppose Kripke's argument that proper names, as rigid, differ from definite descriptions in how they refer.
With this in mind, Chapters 5 through 7 address the topics of proper names, fictional entities, and natural kind terms, taking pains to show that notions like rigid designation and truth in fiction can be accommodated or replaced without appeal to possible worlds.
In order to make the minimal rigid designation work, one has to presuppose an essentialist version of haecceitism.
By contrast, I argue in chapter 10 of Beyond Rigidity that a unified explanation of the necessity of (1-4) can be given using other aspects of Kripke's semantic analysis, above and beyond the notion of rigid designation (or essentiality of predicates).
In Gallois 1986 I developed an account of rigid designation which was designed to make room for the contingency of identities.
This seems to suggest the purely denotative character of names, a point that has been interpreted as in line with the causal account and its emphasis on rigid designation.