salva veritate


Also found in: Wikipedia.

salva veritate

(ˈsælvə ˌvɛrɪˈtɑːteɪ)
adv
(Logic) philosophy without affecting truth-value
References in periodicals archive ?
Co-hyperintensionality, or hyperintensional equivalence, is a relation holding between two or more contents that can be substituted in a hyperintensional context salva veritate. The author argues that two strategies used to provide criteria for co-hyperintensionality (appeal to some form of impossible worlds, or to structural or procedural equivalence of propositions) fail.
This means that its reference is fixed and it can be substituted for any name or definite description of the same object in any context salva veritate.
Leibniz formula, por exemplo, em varios textos logicos, seu famoso principio de substitutibilidade salva veritate, o qual afirma que dois termos sao identicos em significado quando podem ser substituidos um pelo outro nas sentencas sem que isso acarrete nenhuma alteracao do valor de verdade destas.
Finalmente, Avila dice que otra razon importante para rechazar el esencialismo es que este recurre a nociones que violan abiertamente la maxima extensional segun la cual dos expresiones coextensivas son intercambiables en todos los contextos, salva veritate. Aqui quiero hacer dos comentarios.
Dado que los terminos "9" y "el numero de planetas" no son intercambiables en todas sus ocurrencias salva veritate, se podria suponer que no son, despues de todo, codenotativos.
If one or more translations are acceptable, salva veritate, still the grammatical effects are usually lost.
So, "taller than" creates a context that allows substitution both of co-extensional names and definite descriptions and of logically equivalent components within its scope salva veritate, in which case "er-than" in (6) does as well.
This is not, as is sometimes thought, merely because predicates and singular terms cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate (congruitate).
This is what is properly called 'the Principle of Substitutivity' or 'the Salva Veritate Principle'.
Esta consideracion basta para rechazar ad portas la intercambiabilidad salva veritate (22) como criterio de sinonimia; pues lo que es verdadero de toda criatura con corazon lo es de facto de toda criatura con rinones.
I examine the relation between different kinds of these: while, traditionally, the terms "wisdom" and "the property of being wise" were thought to be co-referential, in certain contexts they do not seem to be interchangeable salva veritate. Observing this, Friederike Moltmann claims that abstract nouns such as "wisdom" do not refer to properties.
Referentialism entails substitutivity, that is, that coreferring terms are intersubstitutable salva veritate. Frege's Paradox shows that referentialism is inconsistent given two principles: disquotation says that if S assents to P, then S believes that P, and consistency says that if S believes that P and that not-P, then Sis not fully rational.