Abstract: This paper discusses the relation between Kant's doctrine of pure apperception (thedoctrine of the "I think")and Fichte's theory of self-positing
. It shows that Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of apperception is closer to Fichte's principle of self-positing
than is usually thought, and that Kant's "I think," and not Reinhold's "principle of consciousness", may have been a source of inspiration for Fichte in his attempt to justify transcendental idealism.
According to Fichte, the absolute self is absolutely self-positing
. It is expressed in the proposition of perfect self-identity and self-sufficiency: I = I.
Building on Manfred Frank's discussion of the Fichte-Studien, Trap reconstructs Novalis's rejection of Fichte's account of an originary self-positing
I, instead proposing a pre-reflective feeling ("Gefuhl") in touch with the undifferentiated givenness of Being, referred to by Frank as a kind of "beziehungslose Vertrautheit." On Trap's account, Novalis amalgamated these Fichtean reflections with his reading of the 1795 translation of John Browns Elements of Medicine.
It reads the poem fully attentive to its nexus of image-making, arguing that its images envelop a complex and multiple self-positing
through which the machinic implications of the peacock make each individuated interpretation possible.
Fichte argues that we have an intellectual intuition in the self-positing
of the I and attempts to ground systematic philosophy in this intuition.
It first considers the link between the idea of the self-positing
land freedom, as well as the bifurcation of the I into cognition and volition.
The negative unity implicit in the chemical process, and through which it is the process that it is, is now more explicitly self-positing
or self-mediating-it has become explicit self-determination.
Through the lens of Humboldt's system, we can discern that the risks of performative self-positing
and world-positing, the dependence upon uptake/legitimation, and the fear of imminent breakdown are thematized by some of the major authors of the romantic era, including Coleridge, HSlderlin, Kleist, and Godwin (on all of whom Esterhammer includes chapters).
According to Loureiro, Levinas holds that "the self is not an autonomous, self-positing
entity, but it originates as a response to, and thus as a responsibility toward [this] other" (xi).
In the seventh fascicle of the Opus postumum, Kant contemplates the doctrine of self-positing
(Selbstsetzungslehre), according to which the subject posits itself first as transcendental and then as empirical apperception, first as cogitabile, then as dabile.
The human being, then, is 'an extra-temporal coming-to-be of the very eternally self-positing
Fichte and the Relationship between Self-Positing
and Rights', NEDIM NOMER