takeover target

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Related to Target Firms: target company
ThesaurusAntonymsRelated WordsSynonymsLegend:
Noun1.takeover target - a company that has been chosen as attractive for takeover by a potential acquirer
company - an institution created to conduct business; "he only invests in large well-established companies"; "he started the company in his garage"
sleeping beauty - a potential takeover target that has not yet been put in play
References in periodicals archive ?
Alternatively, when low levels of ownership are purchased, target firms continue to possess the autonomy necessary to adopt resource deployment patterns unaffected by the norms of other organizational units within the acquiring firm.
One 2003 article, summarizing the findings of prior studies, concludes that the shareholders of target firms do benefit, but that gains to the acquirer's shareholders are usually close to zero--or even worse.
Acquiring and target firms can exhibit pre-merger differences in either levels of compensation or in compensation mix, including salary and performance-based components such as bonuses, restricted stock, long-term incentive plans, and stock options.
Side by side with your list of target firms should be a list of how best to influence them," Flesher said.
Therefore, in an efficient market, any repricing of excess pension assets, or wealth transfers associated with these assets due to the announcement of the acquisition proposal, will be reflected in the abnormal returns of the acquiring and target firms.
In particular, we test whether institutional ownership in target firms has any bearing on the type of antitakeover defense launched by target firms as well as the success of takeover bids.
In general, the basic findings from the event studies of the announcement effects of mergers provide generally consistent evidence that there are gains to stockholders of target firms.
Jarrell |1985~ found that shareholders of target firms receiving multiple takeover bids obtained risk-adjusted returns 17 percent higher than shareholders of target firms receiving only one takeover bid.
Asquith |1983~ argues that target firms achieve significant positive abnormal returns during the merger process while bidding firms do not.
Furthermore, Fowler and Schmidt (1989) found lower post-acquisition performance for acquirers of hostile targets than for acquirers of friendly target firms.
So, how do you price M&A transactions considering the behavior of the acquirer and target firms, while considering the changes in the business cycle?
The median score for target firms is seven, while the median score for acquiring firms is eight.